COMMANDERS DIGEST

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TRI-SERVICE CEREMONY—Newly-promoted VAdm. John A. Tyree Jr., new Chief of Staff for Headquarters, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) gets an assist with his new shoulder boards from Army Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer (right), EUCOM Commander in Chief, and Air Force Gen. David A. Burchinal, Deputy Commander in Chief.

Air Force Chief of Staff Testifies On Posture of U.S. Tactical Forces

There are indications that the Soviets have increasingly accepted the idea that a non-nuclear conflict between nuclear powers is a possibility in which tactical forces would play a major role, according to Gen. John P. McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff.

Gen. McConnell's testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services released July 22, was confined primarily to the fighter and attack and special warfare (SAW) forces.

He said "these offensive forces constitute the principal means to meet threats at levels less than strategic nuclear war." They (Tactical forces) are designed — qualitatively and quantitatively—to implement national policy in crisis situations or prolonged conflict. These forces are required to respond rapidly and to execute highly specialized tasks worldwide.

Traditionally, he said, the tasks assigned to these forces are close air support of ground forces, isolation of the battle area through interdiction of lines of communication, and air supremacy over enemy offensive and defensive forces. Air Force units in Southeast Asia and those recently deployed to South Korea are examples of our forces operating within the framework of these concepts.

Discussing the Communist airpower posture, Gen. McConnell said "we believe that in the mid-1970s the Warsaw Pact air forces may have fewer

(Continued on Page 3)

SecDef Gives Details On Enemy Helicopter Sightings, Attacks

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford has answered questions regarding helicopter sightings and attacks on Navy ships off the DMZ in Vietnam.

He had deferred replying at a previous news conference, pending the completion of an inquiry into the matter. This was accomplished and the following information was provided the press:

"A board of investigation has completed an inquiry into a night action off the coast of Vietnam on the nights of 15-16 and 16-17 June 1968 when ground observers reported sighting a number of enemy helicopters. In some instances surface radar in the area also detected targets reported as helicopters. Fighter aircraft were scrambled to attack these reported enemy helicopters. Firing air-to-air missiles at targets held on aircraft radar, the aircrews reported possible destruction of helicopters.

"Simultaneous to these operations friendly Navy surface units in the coastal waters adjacent to the DMZ reported being attacked by enemy helicopters and aircraft.

"During these actions USS Boston (CAG-1) and HMAS Hobart (D-39) were damaged and U. S. Navy PCF-19 was sunk by air attack.

"The board of investigation concluded that the attacks on Navy surface units on nights 15-16 and 16-17 June in the area were inadvertently made by friendly aircraft. Positive reaction to a reported enemy air threat, difficulty in discriminating between air and surface targets on fighter aircraft radar in the low altitude attack environment, and in-

(Continued on Page 3)

FAA Advises Use of "Chaff" in Flight Emergencies

Emergency procedures for general aviation pilots experiencing communications trouble now includes the dropping of strips of chaff, first used during World War II to create confusion by making false targets on enemy radar.

The Federal Aviation Administration advised the use of chaff as an inflight emergency signal beginning July 1.

Chaff—usually aluminum foil which is dropped within radar coverage—normally can be detected by FAA radar equipment and enhances the target of a small plane on the radar display.

Without falling chaff, the FAA said, a small airplane operating at lower altitudes may go undetected by an air traffic controller during an emergency situation.

The Advisory Circular (90-36), dated May 22, and entitled "The Use Of Chaff As An Inflight Emergency Signal," can be obtained through the Department of Transportation Distribution Unit, TAD-484.3, Washington, D. C. 20590.

Pilots intending to declare an emergency in this manner should use the following procedure:

Fly a straight course, open and drop a box of chaff every two miles until four drops have been made. Continue on course for two miles and then make a 360 degree turn at a rate of three degrees per second to the left.

Repeat the 360 degree turns at two-mile intervals until four turns have been completed. The chaff pattern will enhance the possibility of detection by the radar controller and will assist him in providing assistance.

A controller may request a pilot who is lost to drop chaff as a means of establishing his position. But, pilots are requested not to drop chaff unless they are declaring an emergency.

The FAA pointed out that in addition to dropping chaff, other methods of declaring an emergency are: Emergency squawk from transponders; sending an emergency message, and flying triangular pattern.

Use of chaff as an effective means for a pilot of a general aviation airplane to declare an emergency since many smaller aircraft are not equipped with transponders, and both transmitting and receiving radio equipment may fail.

The FAA said chaff may be procured from commercial sources and should be readily available to those who wish to take advantage of the additional safety and security it will provide.

If a source is not available, local pilot organizations should have information pertaining to chaff purchases. Strips of chaff intended for detection by air route surveillance radar (ARSR) are about four and a half inches in length and those for use with airport surveillance radar (ASR) about two inches long.

Bundles of packets of chaff made up for use by pilots are about three by five by one inches in size, weigh about six ounces and should contain quantities of both lengths to cover both air route and airport radar equipment. The packets are designed to open in the slipstream and scatter after being dropped from a plane.



ARMED FORCES STRENGTH—The graph shows total strength figures for the U.S. armed forces for selected years between 1935 and 1968. Information was supplied by the Directorate for Statistical Services, Department of Defense.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Helicopters

(Continued from Page 1)

adequate coordination between friendly forces involved in the action contributed to the inadvertent attacks on friendly forces.

"No physical evidence of helicopters destroyed has been discovered in the area of activity. Nor has extensive reconnaissance produced any evidence of enemy helicopter operations in or near the DMZ.

"Actions have been taken to provide improved coordination and control to preclude mutual interference by all forces in the area and to minimize the possibility of such attacks on friendly forces in the future."

INSPECTION TOUR—Lt. Col. P. E. Woodruff Jr., Commander, Battalion Landing Team 3/2, points out areas and sectors of responsibility during a tactical exercise to Brig. Gen. E. B. Wheeler, Commanding General, 2d Marine Division. The exercise was conducted at Landing Zone Falcon as part of the CG's inspection.

Gen. McConnell on Tactical Forces

(Continued from Page 1)

aircraft, while the Asian Communist nations will maintain about their present inventories. Qualitatively, however, these forces will improve by acquiring new aircraft and better armament."

The general said a percentage of Soviet tactical aviation is now composed of the MIG-21, a Mach 2 tactical fighter, the SU-7, a ground attack fighter, and the YAK-28, a supersonic light bomber.

He said Soviet ground forces have a variety of mobile tactical missiles ranging from the SCUD ballistic missile to short-range tube-launched rockets. This system, featuring three missiles mounted on a tracked mobile transporter-launcher, was displayed by the Soviets last November with the announcement that it had a low-altitude capability.

Gen. McConnell completed this phase of his testimony by stating: "The total threat involves not only the Communist's formidable military capability but also their encouragement and support of revolutions through subversion and insurgency. The crisis situations that arise from this strategy will continue to challenge the security of the United States and the free world."

Turning to the posture of the U.S. Air Force fighter and attack and SAW forces, Gen. McConnell said "worldwide, our fighter and attack forces are distributed among three major Air Force Commands. Units located in the continental United States (CONUS) are assigned to the Tactical Air Command (TAC), those in the Pacific to the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) and those in Europe to U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE).

The special air warfare forces complement our tactical forces and perform highly specialized tasks in all phases of the conflict spectrum. The SAW mission includes counterinsurgency, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, and civic action.

Gen. McConnell's testimony then covered "force improvement efforts, force development and future needs, the F-X (an advanced tactical fighter) and the A-X concept (an aircraft designed specifically and exclusively for close air support).

Summarizing, Gen. McConnell said "the threat encompasses the global and improving capabilities of the Communist powers to undertake nonnuclear war and to support insurgency and subversion.

"This underlines the need for improved U.S. tactical air capabilities across the spectrum of warfare.

"The size and composition of our tactical forces are determined by the variety of tasks that must be performed and the contingencies that may occur. The recent deployment of forces to Korea and the threat of conflict there justifies preparedness to meet more than one contingency.

"I believe we must capitalize on the substantial technological achievements available to us and develop a modern air superiority fighter aircraft. That is the F-X. Additionally, we must develop a specialized close air support aircraft to provide our frontline troops with improved fire support.

"That is primarily the A-X and to some extent the A-7.

"Finally, we must have the capability to deploy these forces worldwide at any time and conduct all-weather, around-the-clock operations rapidly, at austere bases."

AMERICAN POLICY AND PURPOSES IN VIETNAM

American assistance to the Republic of Vietnam is a natural and integral part of our entire post-World War II foreign policy. Our purposes and our policy in Vietnam can best be understood when viewed in that context. Above all, we are in Vietnam because the entire direction of American foreign policy since World War II requires us to be here. We made a commitment in the course of that war and reaffirmed it at its end: We are committed to the belief that the rule of force must give way to the rule of law. We made a commitment, to ourselves and to history, to bend every effort to the task of building an international community of independent states, free to determine their own form of government and with the capacity for resolving their disputes by peaceful means.

We did not make that commitment lightly, nor has it been easily or cheaply upheld. For more than 20 years, American lives, blood and treasure have been spent in the name of free peoples fighting to determine their own course in history. We have upheld that principle and obligation many times and in many places—in Iran, Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Korea, the Congo, and here in Vietnam. Each time we have sought the same limited ends: self-determination for a nation and a people threatened by aggression and subversion. Our commitment to that principle is also at the heart of our unprecedentedly strong and generous support for the United Nations.

U.S. Commitment to Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination runs as an unbroken thread throughout our history from its beginning. We were the first anticolonial power in modern history, and we still are an anticolonial power. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has said that one who wishes to understand the foreign policy of the United States must understand the deep significance for Americans of the idea of "the consent of the governed," and I find I cannot overemphasize the importance of that idea for our policy in Vietnam. It makes clear the motives underlying our presence here, in support of a nation whose people have proven their willingness to defy terrorism and outright aggression in order to take part in the choosing of their leaders and the development of their land. At the same time it makes clear the limits on our aims in Vietnam, for we have repeatedly and sincerely stated our readiness to abide by whatever choices the South Vietnamese people themselves make freely for their future.

The American commitment to the principle of self-determination is and has always been bipartisan, a commitment supported consistently by both of our major parties and their leaders. Three American Presidents—President Dwight D. Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and President Lyndon B. Johnson—have held firm to that principle as it applies to Vietnam. Members of the Congress of the United States, of both parties, also support it.

In my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of most Americans, our assistance to the Republic of Vietnam is important in another respect. Vietnam is the most crucial test today of the viability of the American commitment. Our actions here are in response to our obligations under the Southeast Asia Mutual Defense Treaty and the protocol to that treaty which extended its protection to the Republic of Vietnam. We have similar treaty obligations in other areas of the world, all of them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes the right of national self-determination and self-defense. The credibility of our commitments under those treaties has, I believe, been a very large contributing factor to world peace during the last 20 years. It is no less true here in Vietnam. And as it has been elsewhere, I am confident that the commitment will be upheld here.

Importance of Vietnamese Role

The American role in Vietnam is related to, and in a sense dependent upon, your own. And yours of course remains most important. The crucial decisions affecting Vietnam in the future years must and will be South Vietnamese decisions—and you will be among the men making those decisions and carrying them out. The goals toward which you will be working, and in which we will support you, are many. They were clearly summarized in the three objectives emphasized by President Nguyen Van Thieu in his inaugural address: "to set up democratic institutions, to improve social conditions, and to find a solution to the war."

The building of democratic institutions and the political development which must accompany it, as well as the achievement of a political solution to this conflict, can come only through the efforts of all the people of South Vietnam. Not only must the framework of constitutional government be completed—with the establishment of a Supreme Court, an Inspectorate, and the advisory councils—but there is a pressing need for strong political organizations to give it life, political parties capable of enlisting the active support of the population. The enemy is tightly organized and disciplined. South Vietnamese nationalists must also become organized and disciplined, without of course employing the methods of the Communists. Similarly, economic development, social progress, and the military strength necessary to undergird and protect these accomplishments must be primarily South Vietnamese in origin.

I am sure that you recognize the primacy of your role in this conflict, and the supporting nature of ours, and agree that it can only be this way. It is clear to me that the Vietnamese people are now determined to do all that their role demands, and I am sure that the United States is equally determined to fulfill its proper role.

You are familiar with the position of the United States regarding a negotiated settlement of this war. Nonetheless, perhaps it would be useful to review the major points in that position; they are shared by your Government.

We seek an honorable settlement, one which will protect the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. As President Johnson declared, ". . . the United States will never accept a fake solution to this long and arduous struggle and call it peace." We do not seek, nor will we accept, an imposed coalition between the legitimate constitutional government of South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

False Suggestions

Secretary of State Rusk . . . described as "mischievous and false" suggestions that the United States was prepared to impose a Communist role upon the South Vietnamese Government and people regardless of their views. He emphasized that the position of the U.S. Government on this question is unchanged. Nor does the United States seek a settlement which would involve the ceding of one meter of territory of the Republic of Vietnam. That, too, would be a "fake solution."

What we do seek is a settlement which will meet the need for a durable peace and stability in all of Southeast Asia. It should provide assurances, including an effective system of supervision and guarantees, for the independence of Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam.

We do not seek to impose our rule on North Vietnam or to destroy its government. But we insist that North Vietnam give up its futile hopes of imposing its will upon its neighbors. The question of the reunification of North and South Vietnam—which Hanoi seeks to resolve by force of arms—must be decided in freedom and in peace, in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people of Vietnam rather than the coercive demands of the North Vietnamese Government.

Finally, we seek a settlement which will provide regional solutions for what are essentially regional problems. The political, economic, and social development of Southeast Asia is a task which must be undertaken cooperatively by the nations of Southeast Asia. And if these development goals are to be achieved, they must be undertaken in peace. As President Johnson declared at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965, we stand ready to assist in that development if our assistance is required.

These are decisive times in the history of your country and mine and, indeed, the world. Important challenges face us here and great opportunities. Together with many of my countrymen, I have a strong faith in the capacity of the Vietnamese people to meet these challenges and these opportunities—to defend their freedom and to develop their land. I would hope that you will not allow the bitterness of the past and the difficulties of the present to obscure the promise of the future. I would hope, too, that you would not allow differences among you to blunt or dissipate the force which a unified country can exert. With unity of purpose, you have every reason to look to the future with confidence.

I would also hope that as we move ahead—whether it be on the battlefield, at the conference table, or both—that the Republic of Vietnam, the United States, and our other brave allies will continue to work closely and harmoniously together and with full confidence in each other. Our enemy would like nothing better than to sow division and distrust between the Republic of Vietnam and its allies.

The Communists' military and propaganda thrusts are often designed to do just that. You will recall, for example, that during the Tet offensive there were widely circulated rumors, undoubtedly instigated and sustained by the Communists, to the effect that the United States was somehow implicated in those attacks and intended to use them for some nefarious purpose. The valor and sacrifice of many American soldiers, fighting shoulder to shoulder with your own, was required to put that rumor finally to rest. But despite these efforts, the Communists have not succeeded in dividing us, and we must never allow them to succeed.

We Stand Beside You

You are daily proving your determination to protect your nation and your freedom; we stand steadfastly beside you. We did not come to Vietnam to lose many of our finest youth and our treasure to permit the defeat of our common goals. You need not fear—and Hanoi need not hope—that our commitment to your valorous cause has weakened. It has not, and it will not.

I have spoken of the purpose of our presence here and the policy underlying it. President Johnson, in his address to the American people on March 31, expressed the essence of that purpose and that policy.

". . . let men everywhere know . . . that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready . . . to defend an honored cause—whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifices that duty may require."

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* *Excerpts of an address by Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, before officer-students at the National Defense College in Saigon.*

DOD Launches Food Research Program

Effective immediately, a single, coordinated and viable food research, development, testing and engineering program (RDT&E) will be formulated and executed to continually upgrade the general and specialized military feeding programs and to meet feeding requirements as they change with changing modes of warfare.

A major objective of the program is to support the Defense Department Uniform Food Service Program by assuring the timely introduction of new and improved food items, preservation methods, packaging and new feeding systems as well as the improvement of feeding systems already in use.

DOD Instruction (3200.10), dated July 12, 1968, establishes policy and assigns Defense Department responsibility for the research, development, testing and engineering of foods, food packaging, food service equipment and systems and related function.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering is responsible for supervising and monitoring the food RDT&E program.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) is responsible for insuring that the output of the food RDT&E program is properly integrated into the Uniform Food Service Program. He is also responsible for providing input to the food RDT& E, program in the form of recommendations for research and development projects.

The Secretary of the Army is assigned responsibility for formulating the Department of Defense food RDT&E program, subject to the review and approval of Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The Army will execute the approved RDT&E program in coordination with other military departments and appropriate DOD components.

The Navy and Air Force will provide liaison representatives to, or will support joint staffing of Army RDT&E activities for the purpose of providing individual military service viewpoints and expertise.

The secretaries of the military departments or their designated representatives will propose to the Secretary of the Army those research, development, and engineering projects for which they may have unique requirements for incorporation into the DOD food RDT&E Program.

Each military department should inform the Army of characteristics it requires in foods, food packaging, or food equipment in those areas in which that department may be the sole user.

The instruction said tests to determine whether proposed standard items meet specialized service requirements will be conducted under the direction of the Army but with appropriate military service participation.

In formulating and implementing the food RDT&E program, the instruction said the Army will give full consideration to the requirements of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and will apply appropriate efforts toward meeting these requirements.

The exchange of information for formulation, accomplishment, review and decisions concerning the program will be through designated representatives of the Secretaries of the military departments.

The instruction includes, but is not limited to the following elements of food service and food service:

1—Nutritional requirements and adequacy under all conditions.

2—Food chemistry, microbiology, processing, preservation, packaging, stability and consumer acceptance.

3—Food preparation, holding, serving and handling equipment.

4—Food service systems, materiel and facilities for all environments and all operating conditions.

5—Recipes, menus, operational rations, and food packets.

6—Specifications data for food and related packaging, equipment and systems.

NEW 7th AF COMMANDER—Gen. George S. Brown (left), new Commander, 7th Air Force and Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV, is greeted on arrival at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., MACV commander.

DOD Official Testifies On Mail Harassment Of Servicemen, Families

There have been only 34 officially reported incidents since May 1965 in which servicemen or their families have received objectionable letters or post cards, a Defense official has reported.

In hearings on privacy and the use of mailing lists, Col. William A. Temple, USAF, told a House subcommittee on postal operations that the collected incidents do not suggest the use of mailing lists.

"On the contrary," Col. Temple said, "as several of the cases disclose, it would appear that perpetrators of these vicious acts secure the names and addresses of the families whom they victimize from such readily available sources as local newspaper obituary articles or from other publicity attendant on the death or injury of a serviceman."

Col. Temple, director of legislative programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), also said the incidents do not suggest the existence of an organized campaign of such mailings.

"The number and character of the incidents indicate that they are individual efforts by the same warped and diseased minds that are capable of making obscene telephone calls . . . or sending false telegraphic casualty messages to families of servicemen," Col. Temple said.

The colonel also reported that harassment from other sources—telephone, personal visits and telegrams—shows essentially the same pattern of individual actions rather than a campaign of organized groups. The total number of those incidents, plus those through the mail, identified by DoD, amount to fewer than 300 since 1965, he said.

NEW ASSIGNMENT—Air Force Lt. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis Jr. (left), is welcomed to his new assignment as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command by Army Gen. Theodore J. Conway, Commander in Chief, Strike Command, during formal arrival ceremonies at MacDill AFB, Fla.

Secretary Rusk Outlines Proposals To USSR on Berlin Situation

When Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussed the Berlin situation with officials of West Germany a few weeks ago he said "free access to Berlin is a vital interest of the three Western Powers, as well as of the Federal Republic of Germany, and any interference with such access can lead to a very grave situation."

In addition, he said "it was clear in our discussion with our NATO allies that there is complete NATO solidarity on this matter."

The Western powers have called on the Soviet Union "to take the measures necessary to ensure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport" for the "movement of persons and goods . . . between the Eastern Zone and the Western Zone and between the Zones and Berlin," in fulfillment of the obligations it assumed in the Four Power communique of June 20, 1949.

East German authorities since June 12 have been demanding visas for travel by German citizens to and from Berlin and between the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany. On July 1 they imposed additional levies on goods traffic entering East Germany.

The requirement for travel documents by East German authorities, as well as the requirement that German residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin, declare themselves in visa application forms as "citizens of the independent political entity of West Berlin," are incompatible with the status of the city as it results from international agreements in force, the State Department said.

The tripartite note to the Soviet Union points out that "Under the terms of these agreements . . . there is no independent political entity of West Berlin but a special Berlin area, comprising all four sections to be administered as a whole."

The note points out further that the East German restrictions "are in absolute contradiction to the aim of relaxation of tension" between Eastern and Western Europe which the three governments and the Federal Republic of Germany have been seeking, and also "represent an anachronism in a world moving toward freedom of travel."

Sec. Brown—U.S. Military Strength Well Balanced

Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown does not believe American military strength is spread too thin.

Addressing the Annual Convention of the Exchange Club in Kansas City, Mo., July 29, Secretary Brown pointed out the United States was able to build its troops strength to 550,000 men in Vietnam; able to increase its forces in Korea after the Pueblo incident last winter and maintain its commitments in NATO and elsewhere abroad, without any general mobilization.

In fact, he said "only after three years of war did we have to call upon any of our Reserve Forces, and then but a fraction of them—38,000 out of the 925,000 who are on paid drill status."

He said this was not only unprecedented in our military history, but that it should also be remembered that while we have only six per cent of the population of the world, we still produce over one-third of its economic product each year. He explained that last fiscal year our military and economic aid combined amounted to a little less than one-third of one per cent of our gross national product, or about $2½ billion —of which $1 billion was in economic aid loans.

Secretary Brown said the United States is not trying to impose any so-called "Pax Americana" on the world. "The only sort of peace we want," he said, "is an international system based on free and independent states—a peace based on cooperation."

Declaring that the United States does not want to establish "any sort of hegemony over the rest of mankind," Secretary Brown said "we intend to serve as respected and useful friends, not domineering overlords.

"We certainly do not want to be thrust into the role of a global gendarme. This is precisely why we furnish military assistance to other nations—so they can provide as much of their own defense as possible, and not have to depend solely on American strength for their protection."

With regard to the threat of aggression, Secretay Brown said "it is undeniable that there is a welcome and continuing evolution of society in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but it is not, as some might say, an unqualified mellowing of Communism."

The threat of force, and its use, he said, "is unquestionably still at or near the surface in Communist relations with the rest of the world, and even within its own circle.

"The Soviets have not hesitated to extend their military presence into areas where they see opportunity or where a power vacuum seems likely. In the aftermath of last year's Near Eastern War and coincident with British withdrawal east of Suez, the Russians have moved into the Middle East with massive military assistance and large numbers of military advisors. They now have a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean, have established their presence in the Red Sea littoral, and have sent ships to call on Persian Gulf ports. And, of course, they are the mainstay of the North Vietnamese effort against South Vietnam."

FIRST M-16 SHIPMENT — RAdm. Kenneth L. Veth, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam and Chief, Naval Advisory Group, presents an M-16 rifle to a Vietnamese Navy officer as token of the first shipment of M-16s to be turned over to the Vietnamese Navy.

Referring to the charge that military assistance retards the developing nations by diverting their scarce resources to arms, the Secretary of the Air Force said "it is significant to note that the five nations receiving the lion's share of U.S. military aid today have achieved, or very nearly so, a self-sustaining economic growth.

"Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea and the Republic of China are programmed for about 81 per cent—$365 million—of the total military aid funds requested of Congress this year. That they get such a high percentage of our total military aid is a reflection of their geographical proximity to the direct threat of aggression. With United States support, these five nations maintain two million men under arms.

"They are in the forefront of free-world defenses. Funds proposed for them provide for modernization of some of their weapons—fighter aircraft, tanks, improved radars, and other equipment to increase mobility, firepower and communications — but most of the money is to maintain current forces."

Explaining the purpose of military aid to the developing countries, Secreary Brown said it is "to enable their military forces to play their proper role in maintaining national sovereignty and internal stability."

He said this is an especially important precondition to political, economic and social progress when externally-fostered pressures against their societies presents a clear threat of continuing violence.

"It is essential to realize," he said, "that world politics today are truly global, and that, in this increasingly multipolar world, the superpowers can no longer dominate events as they once did."

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